The ALJ Fiasco-A Reprise
Antonin Scaliat
The subject of administrative hearing officers is once again on
the agenda of federal regulatory reform. Several of the leading reform proposals in the Congress seek to improve the quality of administrative law judges (ALJs) by changing their virtual life tenure
to a term appointment for seven or ten years, with reappointment
conditional upon some minimal performance standard.'
It is surely a sign of great progress that the debate should now
center about so demanding a requirement as quality. The last time
the subject of hearing officers attracted serious congressional attention, the issue was basic impartiality. When, in 1947, the Civil Service Commission was developing its rule regarding the qualifications
of incumbent hearing officers to serve in the new "hearing examiner'" positions established by the 1946 Administrative Procedure
Act (APA), 3 the Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, supported by the American Bar Association, urged a vigorous campaign
against ready acceptance of these individuals. He believed many of
them to be "men of bias, of ideological preconceptions, of partisan
fealty, of subservience to pressure groups, of habits of unfairness, of
disregard of the true values and weight of evidence." 4 What ensued,
veteran administrative lawyers will recall, was what one commentator appropriately dubbed "The Hearing Examiner Fiasco Under the
Administrative Procedure Act." 5 To pass upon the qualifications of
t Professor of Law, The University of Chicago.
I S. 755, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 211 (1979); S.262, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 208 (1979).
2 The original statutory title was "examiner," 60 Stat. 237, 244 (1946). This was changed
to "hearing examiner" in the 1966 codification, 80 Stat. 386, 415. In 1972, pursuant to its
authority to establish official class titles "for personnel, budget, and fiscal purposes," 5
U.S.C. § 5105(c) (1976), the Civil Service Commission adopted use of the title
"Administrative Law Judge," 37 Fed. Reg. 16,787 (1972)-an appellation which the hearing
examiners themselves much preferred, and which had been happily accorded by the lawyers
appearing before them for some years. In 1978, the United States Code was amended by
replacing "hearing examiner" with "administrative law judge" wherever it appeared. Act of
Mar. 27, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-251, 92 Stat. 183.
3 Pub. L. No. 404, ch. 324, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (current version at 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-552,
553-559, 701-706, 1305, 3105, 3344, 5362, 7521 (1976), as amended in part by Civil Service
Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-454, 92 Stat. 1111).
I Letter from Sen. Alexander Wiley to Arthur S. Flemming, Chairman of the U.S. Civil
Service Comm'n (Apr. 5, 1947) (quoting More About Selecting 350 Hearing Examiners, 33
A.B.A.J. 213, 213 (1947)), reprinted in The 350 Hearing Examiners: Chairman Wiley Asks
Open Choices for Fitness, 33 A.B.A.J. 421, 422 (1947).
5 Fuchs, The Hearing Examiner Fiasco Under the Administrative Procedure Act, 63
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the 197 incumbent hearing officers, the Commission established a
seven-man Board of Examiners chaired by the eminent administrative lawyer (and Chairman of the ABA Special Committee on Administrative Law) Carl McFarland.' The Board found a quarter of
the incumbents unqualified and rated many others eligible only for
grades lower than those they occupied. The National Labor Relations Board was particularly hard hit, with 27 of its 41 incumbents
in effect disqualified. The incumbents "organized themselves," 7 displaying for the first time a talent that has come to characterize
8
administrative law judges over the years; a political storm ensued;
and when the dust settled the Commission had repudiated its Board
of Examiners, all members of the Board except one who was a Commission employee had resigned, and almost all incumbent examiners were confirmed in their positions.
It is, as I say, a triumph that thirty years later we should be
concerned not about bias but about bona fide incompetence. Still,
that subject is worth some attention, even if it cannot quite engage
the old emotions. The aim of this. essay is to discuss what seems to
me two allied deficiencies which, in combination, prevent our administrative judges from being as capable and as efficient as they
might be: the manner of their appointment and the manner of their
promotion.
I.

APPOINTMENT

One of the more controversial issues raised in the years of study
and debate that preceded enactment of the APA concerned the
manner in which hearing officers were to be appointed. One
approach was described (and rejected) by the 1941 Report of the
Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure:
"Suggestion has been made that [hearing commissioners] be a
separate corps, not attached to specific agencies, and that they be
appointed, perhaps for life, perhaps for a specified term, by the
President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate." 9 This
idea of appointment by some authority other than the agency has
HARV. L. REV. 737 (1950).
1 For a more detailed treatment of events discussed in this paragraph, see id.; Macy, The
APA and the HearingExaminer: Productsof a Viable PoliticalSociety, 27 FED. B.J. 351, 36469 (1967); Thomas, The Selection of FederalHearing Examiners: Pressure Groups and the
Administrative Process, 59 YALE L.J. 431 (1950).
7 Macy, supra note 6, at 368.

'Id.

I ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMM.
IN GOVERNMENT AGENCIES,
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ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE, ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE

Doc. No.

8, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 47 (1941).

19791

The ALJ Fiasco-A Reprise

had continuing vitality, favored, for example, by a substantial minority of the Conference on Administrative Procedure called by
President Eisenhower in 1953,10 by the 1955 Hoover Commission
Report," and currently by the Federal Administrative Law Judges
Conference. 2 The APA, however, decisively rejected that approach.
While providing that hearing examiners would be removable, and
their compensation determined, only by the Civil Service Commission, as to appointment it specified that "there shall be appointed
by and for each agency as many qualified and competent examiners
as may be necessary."'' 3 As stated in the House and Senate Committee Reports:
That examiners be "qualified and competent" requires the
Civil Service Commission to fix appropriate qualifications and
the agencies to seek fit persons. In view of the tenure and compensation requirements of the section, designed to make examiners largely independent in matters of tenure and compensation, self-interest and due concern for the proper performance
of public functions will inevitably move agencies to secure the
highest type of examiners."
In other words, it was evidently contemplated that the Civil Service
Commission would establish qualifying requirements by general
rule, and that the agencies would then select from among all individuals who met those requirements.' 5
" PRESIDENT'S

CONFERENCE ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE, REPORT 58-59

(1955)

[hereinafter cited as PRESIDENT'S CONFERENCE].
" COMM'N ON ORGANIZATION OF THE EXECUrIvE BRANCH OF THE GOV'T, LEGAL SERVICES AND

PROCEDURE 93 (1955).
22

FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIvE LAW JUDGES CONFERENCE, STATEMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS

TO THE UNITED STATES CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION 12-13 (1973).
13 Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 404, ch. 324, § 11, 60 Stat. 237, 244 (1946)
(emphasis added). The current version is 5 U.S.C. § 3105 (1976), as amended by Act of Mar.
27, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-251, § 2(a)(1), (b)(2), (d)(1), 92 Stat. 183, which provides that "each
agency shall appoint as many administrative law judges as are necessary."
" H.R. REP. No. 1980, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 46 (1946), reprintedin SENATE COMM. ON THE
JUDICIARY, ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE AcT LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, S. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong.,
2d Sess. 235, 280 (1946) [hereinafter cited without cross-reference as APA LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY]. The Senate Committee Report is identical, except for omission of the phrase "in
matters of tenure and compensation," which limitation is treated in the next paragraph of
the report. S. REP. No. 752, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 29 (1945), reprinted in APA LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY at 215.
,SSee Thomas, supra note 6, at 432. The APA's specification that the appointment
process should be "subject to the civil service ... laws to the extent not inconsistent with
this Act," Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 404, ch. 324, § 11, 60 Stat. 244 (1946)
(current version at 5 U.S.C. § 3105 (1976), as amended by Act of Mar. 27, 1978, Pub. L. No.
95-251, § 2(a)(1), (b)(2), (d)(1), 92 Stat. 183), was no obstacle to this arrangement, since the
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This is not, however, what occurred. The regulations issued by
the Commission in September of 194716 adopt the principle that has
been uniformly followed since:'7 not merely the establishment of
qualifying requirements, but also the ranking of individual applicants, would be the responsibility of the Commission, and the
agency role would be limited to selecting among the three applicants
certified by the Commission as best qualified.' 8 Under present procedures, the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) assigns each
applicant up to sixty points for his experience, and up to forty points
on the basis of evaluations (usually written) from persons under
whom or with whom the applicant has worked.
Applicants are also given a rudimentary test of their decisionwriting ability, and are interviewed for about one-half hour by a
panel composed of an OPM representative, an administrative law
judge and a member of the practicing bar; these steps can result in
an upward or downward adjustment of the applicant's score, though
rarely by more than five points. And finally, of course, a representative of the agency (usually the Chief Administrative Law Judge)
reviews the records of, interviews, and may make further inquiries
regarding the three candidates whose names are forwarded by the
OPM.
Obviously, this system has serious weaknesses. Consider, for
example, how the sixty points allocated to "experience" must be
computed: so many points are awarded for having conducted one
sort of litigation practice, so many for another, so many for having
served as judge of one or another court or administrative tribunal,
in one or another state. And the forty points based on written thirdparty evaluation raise the problem not only of undetectable bias for
or against the applicant, but also that of utter incomparability of
standards. What unknown lawyer X in Idaho considers
"outstanding" is not likely to be the same as what unknown lawyer
Y in Pennsylvania considers so.
Still, it is not an irrational system for all purposes and may
indeed be the best that can be devised for any nationwide competition that must select candidates without opportunity for lengthy
civil service laws essentially conferred discretion as to such matters upon the President and
the Commission. See Fuchs, supra note 5, at 739 n.11.
IS 12 Fed. Reg. 6321 (1947).
17 See 5 C.F.R. § 930.203(b) (1979).
" This is the so-called "rule of three." See 5 C.F.R. §§ 332.402, .404 (1979).

The following account of procedures is based on the description provided by Charles
Dullea (then Director of the Office of Administrative Law Judges) to the Meeting of the
Civil Service Commission's Advisory Committee on Administrative Law Judges (Nov. 28,
1977).
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personal observation. 2 It is no worse-except, perhaps, for the
greater incomparability of the personal evaluations-than the essentially paper-record, second-hand evaluation system that is used
by law firms or law school faculties to hire associates or assistant
professors out of law school. But the point is that the winners in this
case do not become associates or assistant professors; they become
effectively life-tenured 2l occupants of positions that are within the
highest levels of the federal career service. The appropriate question
is, therefore, whether any law firm would regularly fill its
partnership vacancies in such a fashion-by conducting a nationwide competition among lawyers who have practiced a specialty
other than that for which the vacancy exists, ranking those lawyers
in a strict numerical order on the basis (primarily) of a paper record
of experience and third-party evaluations, and selecting one of the
top three. None would, of course. Nor would any law faculty select
its tenured members in such a fashion. The assessment necessary
for making appointments to high-level legal positions is thought to
require, except in extraordinary cases, substantial first-hand evaluation of performance-and of performance in the particular branch
of the profession at issue.
It seems proper to ask-indeed, it seems unintelligent not to
ask-why we should not think the same rule desirable for administrative law judges. The ready answer, of course, is that we do not
think it desirable for other federal judges, and that they, rather than
lawyers or law professors, are the proper analogue. But our system
for selecting article IlI judges makes no pretense (or at least no
convincing pretense) of being based primarily upon merit or performance. It is justifiable as a political system for selecting individuals who wield a considerable degree of political power-authority
to overrule the actions of the two elected branches. No such power
inheres in the presiding officers at administrative hearings, even if
2 This analysis disregards one irrational element that is not inherent in the system: the
automatic adding of five points to the final score for a veteran, and ten points for a disabled
veteran. See 5 U.S.C. § 2108(3) (1976), as amended by Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, Pub.
L. No. 95-454, §§ 307(a), 401(d), 92 Stat. 1147, 1154; 5 C.F.R. § 337.101(b) (1979).
21 An APA hearing examiner may be removed "only for good cause established and
determined by the Merit Systems Protection Board on the record after opportunity for hearing." 5 U.S.C. § 7521 (1976), as amended by Act of Mar. 27, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-251, §
2(a)(1), 92 Stat. 183, and Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-454, § 204(a), 92
Stat. 1137. In the 33 years since the enactment of the APA, there have been only a few such
removals. Examiners may be dismissed when there is a reduction in force, but under current
regulations this power cannot be used selectively; dismissals must follow an order of priority
based upon tenure and veterans' preference. Moreover, any examiner so dismissed is accorded
priority in subsequent hirings. See 5 C.F.R. § 930.215 (1979).
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Congress chooses to call them judges. They are entirely subject to
the agency on matters of law;22 they can be reversed by the agency
on matters of fact, even where demeanor evidence is an important
factor;2 and they can always be displaced, if the agency wishes, by
24
providing for hearing before the agency itself or one of its members.
We have, therefore, chosen to use a merit, rather than a political,
system for the selection of administrative law judges; my point is
that, viewed as a merit system, the present regime makes little
sense.
What I am suggesting is that unless (as there is no reason to
believe) the activity of being an administrative law judge is different
from any other field of legal endeavor-or, indeed, any other field
of human endeavor-the best way to achieve excellence is to promote from within, on the basis of observed performance. A blindman's buff, paper-record system is acceptable for the selection of
neophyte judges, at lower levels of salary and responsibility; but the
high-level judges, who are to conduct and decide the most difficult
proceedings, should be chosen principally (if not exclusively) from
among existing judges on a progressive promotion basis. Not only
is this not a revolutionary thought; it is, I believe, the system envisioned by the APA.
If.

PROMOTION

This leads to the second, closely allied subject I wish to discuss:
the promotion of administrative law judges. At present this is virtually a nonissue, since the OPM and the agencies have systematically achieved almost total elimination of the prerequisite for promotion-a variation in grades. As late as 1953, the 294 APA hearing
examiners were distributed broadly among five grade levels from
GS-11 to GS-15;2 in two agencies, the examiners spanned all five
levels. 2 Today, by contrast, all of the 1,134 administrative law
2 See, e.g., Frost v. Weinberger, 375 F. Supp. 1312, 1320 (E.D.N.Y. 1974) ("an Administrative Law Judge is precluded from passing upon the constitutionality of the very procedures
he is called upon to administer"), rev'd on other grounds, 515 F.2d 57 (2d Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 424 U.S. 958 (1976). See also Herd v. Folsom, 231 F.2d 276 (7th Cir. 1956) (sustaining
reversal of AUJ by HEW Appeals Council on issue of law).
m See, e.g., FCC v. Allentown Broadcasting Corp., 349 U.S. 358, 364-65 (1955); International Woodworkers v. NLRB, 262 F.2d 233 (D.C. Cir. 1958); NLRB v. Pyne Molding Corp.,
226 F.2d 818 (2d Cir. 1955).
24 See 5 U.S.C. § 556(b) (1976), as amended by Act of Mar. 27, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95251, § 2(a)(1), 92 Stat. 183.
2 See COMM'N ON ORGANIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE GOV'T,PART VI OF THE
REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON LEGAL SERVICES AND PROCEDURE Chart Im.-A-2 (1955).
21 See Ramspeck v. Federal Trial Examiners Conference, 345 U.S. 128, 135 (1953).
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judges (excluding chief ALJs) occupy only two grade levels, GS-15
and GS-16; in all of the major regulatory agencies ALJs all occupy
the same grade level; in only two agencies do two separate grade
levels coexist.Y
It is interesting to trace the process by which this progressive
evaporation of lower grade levels has occurred. To understand it,
one must understarid the entirely inappropriate provisions of the
civil service laws applicable to the classification of ALJ positions,
and to the promotion of individual judges. To simplify the matter
somewhat, the protected civil service consists initially not of thou21 According to information provided by the Office of Administrative Law Judges, Letter
from John E. Flannery, Acting Director, Office of Administrative Law Judges, Office of
Personnel Management, to Antonin Scalia (Feb. 1, 1980) (on file with The University of
Chicago Law Review), the current breakdown by agency is as follows:
All GS-16
Department of Agriculturea
5
Civil Aeronautics Boarda
14
Commodity Futures Trading Commission
4
Consumer Product Safety Commission
1
Drug Enforcement Administration
1
Environmental Protection Agency
7
Federal Communications Commissiona
13
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission a
21
Federal Labor Relations Authority
10
Federal Maritime Commission
7
Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Administration
18
Federal Trade Commission
13
Food and Drug Administration
2
International Trade Commission
2
Interstate Commerce Commissiona
59
Maritime Administration
3
Merit Systems Protection Board
1
National Labor Relations Boarda
115
National Transportation Safety Board
6
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
1
Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission
48
Securities and Exchange Commission a
8
U.S. Postal Service
2
All GS-15
Coast Guarda
16
Department of Housing and Urban Development
1
Internal Revenue Servicea
1
Social Security Administration
670
GS-16 and GS-15
Department of the Interior
8 GS-16, 5 GS-15
Department of Labora
13 GS-16, 59 GS-15b

NoTE: Figures do not show one-grade supplement for chief ALJs in agencies with ten
or more judges.
a Agencies using selective certification.
Currently under review for upgrading to GS-16.
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sands of different individuals paid according to their ability and
performance, but rather of thousands of different "positions" for
which applicants compete. Each position is assigned a basic pay
level (a General Schedule or "GS" level), which by statute is basedupon "(A) level of difficulty and responsibility; and (B) level of
qualification requirements of the work." 8 The civil service laws contain a (necessarily vague) description of the eighteen separate levels
of (A) difficulty and responsibility, and (B) qualification requirements, into which all work in the protected service is divided. 29 It is
the initial responsibility of each agency to classify its positions, 0
pursuant to standards established by the OPM; 3' but such classification is subject to review by the OPM, 32 and review can be re33
quested by any affected employee.
This system is obviously difficult to apply to professional positions whose duties are essentially intellectual rather than managerial or supervisory. And as applied to ALJ positions it implicitly
involves the distasteful determination that some litigants are entitled to "better" judges than others. These difficulties are compounded by two statutory provisions peculiar to administrative law
judges designed to assure their independence from agency influence.
First is the requirement that administrative law judges "shall be
assigned to cases in rotation so far as practicable. 31 4 Not long after
passage of the APA, the Federal Trial Examiners Conference asserted that this provision, combined with the position-classification
requirements of the civil service laws and regulations described
above, led to the conclusion that all examiners in any single agency
must occupy the same grade level-since they must all do the same
work. This assertion was flatly contradicted by the legislative history of the APA,3 5 and was rejected by the Supreme Court in
" 5 U.S.C. § 5102(a)(5) (1976). See also id. § 5106(a)-(b).
" Id. § 5104. The vagueness of these descriptions can be discerned from the fact that
the only difference between GS-15 and GS-16 is the latitude for exercise of independent
judgment; the former requires "very wide" latitude, the latter "unusual" latitude. Id. §
5104(15)(A), (16)(A).
11Id. § 5107, as amended by Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-454, §§
801(a)(3)(E), 906(a)(2), (3), 92 Stat. 1222, 1224.
1' Id.; 5 U.S.C. § 5105 (1976), as amended by Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L.
No. 95-454, § 906(a)(2), (3), 92 Stat. 1224.
32 5 U.S.C. § 5110 (1976), as amended by Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No.
95-454, § 906(a)(2), (3), 92 Stat. 1224.
5 U.S.C. § 5112(b) (1976), as amended by Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L.
No. 95-454, § 906(a)(2), (3), (17), 92 Stat. 1224.
345 U.S.C. § 3105 (1976), as amended by Act of Mar. 27, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-251, §
2(a)(1), (b)(2), (d)(1), 92 Stat. 183.
13 S. REP. No. 752, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 29 (1945), reprinted in APA LEGISLATwE HISTORY
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Ramspeck v. Federal Trial Examiners Conference.6 "The Act
clearly provides," said the Court, "for the allocation of positions
within an agency to be made in various salary grades, which reflect
the competence and experience of the person in the grade." 3 The
Court's opinion nicely summarizes, by reference to the Government's brief, the function that such allocation was intended to
serve:
Petitioners [the Government] argue that cases in a given
agency are of varying levels of difficulty and importance and
that the examiners hearing them must possess varying degrees
of competency and types of qualifications. Petitioners point to
the experience of the Civil Aeronautics Board where there are
safety cases heard by one group of examiners and economic
cases heard by another. The examiners assigned to the safety
cases have pilots' certificates, while those assigned to the economic cases have completely different types of qualifications.
Again, certain cases before the Interstate Commerce Commission involve relatively simple applications for extensions of
motor carrier certificates, while others involve complicated and
difficult railroad rate proceedings. Petitioners' argument indisame
cates the need for specialization among examiners in 3the
8
agency to meet the diverse types of cases presented.
But the Government's victory in Ramspeck has, over the years,
been deprived of virtually all its significance by the corrosive effect
upon multiple grade levels of the second civil service protection
peculiar to administrative law judges: they "are entitled to pay
prescribed by the Civil Service Commission [now the Office of Personnel Management] independently of agency recommendations or
ratings." The Commission acknowledged from the outset that this
provision required the grade levels for positions to be established by
the Commission itself, rather than by the agencies subject to
Commission review.40 Initially, however, it maintained that the
promotion of examiners from one position to another could be effected by the employing agency itself, by selecting from among the
at 215; H.R. REP. No. 1980, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 46 (1946), reprinted in APA LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY at 280.
" 345 U.S. 128 (1953).
' Id. at 136.
Id. at 134.
, 5 U.S.C. § 5362 (1976), as amended by Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No.
95-454, § 801(a)(1), 92 Stat. 1219.
10 12 Fed. Reg. 6324 (1947).
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three top eligibles certified by the Commission;4 ' in 1949 it went
even further, revising its regulations to permit the agency to fill a
vacant higher-grade position with any of its incumbent examiners,
subject only to Commission approval." This procedure was struck
down in 1951 by an Attorney General's opinion which held that "the
responsibility for determining which hearing examiner should be
promoted to a higher classification [is] to be vested in the Commis4' 3
sion itself instead of in the agencies.
The subsequent history of the ALJ program represents an unremitting retreat from the multi-grade system defended so ardently
in Ramspeck. One of the factors producing that result was, unquestionably, the relentless pressure exerted by the examiners themselves-collectively, through the' Federal Trial Examiners Conference," and individually, through exercise of their statutory right to
request classification review by the Commission on the ground that
the cases they were being assigned were of the same difficulty as
those assigned to higher-grade examiners.4 Pressure to collapse the
multi-grade system also came continuously from the organized
bar," and occasionally from prestigious organizations in which prac7
titioners had substantial participation.
It is likely that these pressures could have been resisted if the
Commission had had the will to do so. Ultimately, the determinative factor that sealed the doom of the multi-grade system was the
" Id. at 6323.
42 14 Fed. Reg. 7501 (1949).

41 'Op. Att'y Gen. 74, 76-79 (1951).
The examiners as a group could only benefit from a single-grade system, since if all
cases were (theoretically, at least) rotated among all examiners in an agency, the highest level
of difficulty would govern.
'3

"

'

See text at note 32 supra.

For example, in 1956 and 1957 the House of Delegates of the American Bar Association
adopted a resolution supporting legislation that would establish all APA hearing examiners
at grade level GS-18. 81 ABA ANNuAL REPORT 402-03 (1956); 82 ABA ANNUAL REPORT 416
(1957).
11For example, the temporary Administrative Conference of the United States established by President Kennedy in 1961 endorsed the principle (by then a fait accompli) of a
single grade per agency, and recommended no more than two grades throughout the federal
service. ADMNISTRATIvE CONFERENCE OF THE UNrrED STATES, FNAL REPORT, Recommendation
28-2(a), (b) at App. IV (1962). The 1953 Conference on Administrative Procedure called by
President Eisenhower had not endorsed the principle of one grade per agency, although some
of its members had ardently urged that it do so. See PRESIDFNT'S CONFERENcE, supra note 10,
at 10, 63. For a description of some of the controversy in the 1953 Conference, and exposition
of the administrators' viewpoint by two commissioners of the Interstate Commerce Commission, see Cross, Statement to the President's Conference on Administrative Procedure Concerning Appointment and Status of Federal Hearing Officers, 22 ICC PRAc. J. 120 (1954);
Tuggle, The Status of Federal Hearing Examiners, 22 ICC PRAc. J. 129 (1954).
"
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sheer impracticability of the arrangements established by the statutory provisions discussed above for determining grades and for
awarding promotions among them. Consider: Roving officials from
the Civil Service Commission-generally of a grade level much
lower than that of the examiners themselves-with no first-hand
knowledge of the substantive or procedural aspects of the matters
with which the examiners had to deal, were to recommend to the
Commission, "independently of agency recommendations or ratings, 4 8 not only the grade levels appropriate for various examiner
assignments, but also the ranking of individual examiners for purposes of promotion to higher grades. Quite obviously, the job either
could not be done well, or could not be done without almost conclusive reliance upon the evaluation of the agency itself or its officers."9
Thus, amidst the battering of repeated requests for classification review and promotion determinations, the Civil Service Commission's annual reports tell the following story:
In 1953-1954:
The Commission . . .conducted a classification survey in
four agencies employing approximately one-half of the Federal
Government's hearing examiners. The survey revealed that
there are fewer "levels of difficulty" now existing among hearing examiner positions since agencies were "rotating" cases
among their examiners to a greater extent than they had in the
past. Under this plan of rotating assignments, more hearing
examiners were handling cases of greater importance and difficulty. As a result, a total of 142 hearing examiners were upgraded from one to two grades in these agencies. 0
In 1954-1955:
As a result of position classification studies made during
this fiscal year, the trend toward reducing the number of grades
of hearing examiners in each of the agencies continued. 51
' 5 U.S.C. § 5362 (1976), as amended by Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No.
95-454, § 801(a)(1), 92 Stat. 1219.
1,Both the House and Senate reports make it clear that the requirement that the Commission act "independently" does not prevent receipt and consideration of agency views and
recommendations. S. REP. No. 752, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 29 (1945), reprinted in APA LEGISLATivE HisTOry at 215; H.R. REP. No. 1980, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 47 (1946), reprinted in APA
LEGISLATIVE HIsToRy at 281. See also 41 Op. Att'y Gen. 74, 79 (1951). The inevitability of
substantial agency influence over promotion decisions through such means is, of course, one
of the reasons for the bar's opposition to a multi-grade system.
71 CIVIL SERV. COMM'N ANN. REP. 57 (1954).
72 CIVIL SERV. COMM'N ANN. REP. 119 (1955).
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In 1960-1961:
67 hearing examiner positions were5 2changed from GS-14 to
GS-15 and the incumbents promoted.
In 1962-1963:
On February 20, 1963, the Civil Service Commission found
the 295 Hearing Examiner positions then classified in grade
GS-15 to be allocable to grade GS-16 ....
Hearing Examiner positions in the following agencies were
also reclassified during fiscal year 1963:
Office of the Solicitor, Interior Department:
from GS-12 to GS-13;
Bureau of Land Management, Interior Department:
from GS-13 to GS-14;
Internal Revenue Service, Treasury Department:
from GS-13 to GS-14;
Social Security Administration, Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare: from GS-13 to GS-14; and
U;S. Coast Guard, Treasury Department:
53
from GS-14 to GS-15.
In 1967-1968:
Positions subject to classification review:
Reclassified upward ...................... 223
454
N o change ...............................
"Finally, in 1961," wrote the Chairman of the Civil Service Commission, "with the classification of all Interstate Commerce Commission hearing examiner positions at GS-15, the goal of a single
grade per agency was achieved and the problem of intra-agency
55
promotions disappeared.
"The problem of intra-agency promotions." It was, to be sure,
regarded as a problem," as was classification review. And with good
reason, given a statutory structure of administration that separated
knowledge from power in the management of hearing officers. We
have thus been led, quite foreseeably, to the current state, in which
78 CIVwm SERv. COMM'N ANN. REP. 31 (1961).
80 CivIL SERv. COMM'N ANN. REP. 35 (1963).
1185 CIVni SERV. COMM'N ANN. REP. 79 (1968).
5 Macy, supra note 6, at 377.
11See also PRESIDENT'S CONFERENCE, supra note 10, at 62 ("one of the strongest points of
[the advocates of a single-grade system] was that the stresses and strains of promotions had
been the largest single problem in the past administration of the hearing officer program").
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all Social Security judges are GS-15 and, with few exceptions, all
administrative law judges in the rest of the government are GS-16.
III.

EFFECTS OF THE CURRENT SYSTEM

With all due sympathy for the factors that have operated to
produce the present system, the results are nonetheless inefficient.
The sheer diversity of formal administrative proceedings requiring
use of an administrative law judge has not diminished since 1946.
Even within a single agency, variation in the level of difficulty is
enormous-not only with respect to diverse cases arising under the
same statutory provision (for example, a simple or a complex Federal Energy Regulatory Commission electric rate case51) but also
with respect to cases arising under totally different provisions of law
(for example, a Federal Communications Commission commoncarrier ratemaking proceeding," as compared with a Federal Communications Commission proceeding to cancel a safety-radiotelephony certificate for a cargo ship"). It is almost as unreasonable to establish a single category of administrative law judges to
hear all such cases as it would be to establish one level of state
judges to hear all civil cases. And it is difficult to believe that chief
administrative law judges do not in fact consider level of difficulty
when they assign widely divergent cases among the members of
their staffs; differences in work performed, however, are not reflected in grade levels assigned.
With a total ALJ corps of over 1,100, the compression of grades
that used to range from GS-11 to GS-15 (which in 1953 produced a
salary range from $5,940 to $11,80011) into grades GS-15 and GS-16
(which currently produces an actual range from $38,160 to $47,5001)
must represent a considerable waste of money.
For example, if all the current GS-16 ALJs were divided evenly
', See 16 U.S.C. § 824d(e) (1976). With respect to such cases covered by the Administrative Conference's 1975 Statistical Report, total brief pages per case ranged from 0 to 22,123,
and ALA opinions varied from 4 to 192 pages. ADMiNIsTRATwE CONFERENCE OF THE U.S.,
FEDERAL ADMINiSTRATivE LAW JUDGE HEARINGS 153 (1975). It is true, no doubt, that the simplicity or difficulty of a particular proceeding cannot always be predicted in advance; but
surely it often can be.
See 47 U.S.C. 99 203-205 (1976).
" See id. § 359.
" Act of Oct. 24, 1951, ch. 554, § 1(a), 65 Stat. 612 (current version at 5 U.S.C.A. § 5332
(West Supp. 1979)).
" The actual salary range is different from that set out in 5 U.S.C.A. § 5332 (West Supp.
1979) of $38,160 to $56,692, since 5 U.S.C. § 5308 (1976) places a ceiling on the General
Schedule salaries equal to the lowest rate for Level V of the Executive Schedule. At the
present time, the beginning salary rate for that level is $47,500. 5 U.S.C.A. § 5332 (West
Supp. 1979).
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among grades GS-14 to GS-16, and if all the current GS-15 ALJs
were divided evenly among grades GS-13 to GS-15, the savings
would be about seven and a half million dollars per year. 2 By federal
government standards that is not a lot, but to paraphrase what the
late Senator Dirksen used to say, "Seven and a half million dollars
here, seven and a half million dollars there-pretty soon it adds up
to real money."
Perhaps, however, a more realistic assessment is not that this
money would be saved, but that it could be better spent for the
improvement of the administrative process. My interest in this subject was first generated by a comment made to me when I was
Chairman of the Administrative Conference by a newly appointed
Commissioner of the Federal Communications Commission, complaining about the inordinate proportion of so-called "supergrade"
positions (GS-16 and above) occupied by administrative law judges.
Supergrades, and the Senior Executive Service (SES) positions into
which most supergrades have been converted by the Civil Service
Reform Act of 1978,63 occupy a special status within the federal
service. The law places a limitation upon their total number,6 4 and
permits them to be established only by the OPM rather than by the
employing agencies.65 They are of course much sought after by all
the agencies, and their allocation is substantially controlled by the
Office of Management and Budget. 6 As of July 13, 1979, ALJs comprised the following percentages of total career supergrade and SES
employees in the indicated agencies:67
Civil Aeronautics Board
Commodity Futures Trading Commission
Federal Communications Commission
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

42%
31%
32%
46%

,2These figures are based on current salaries, assuming both that all positions are in step
one of the grade levels and that fringe benefits equal 15% of salary. As to the latter, see S.
REP. No. 697, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 6-7 (reproducing Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate of Jan. 6, 1978), reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.NEws 496, 501.
65 Pub. L. No. 95-454, § 402(a), 92 Stat. 1156 (to be codified at 5 U.S.C. § 3132(a)(2)).
, The current ceiling is 10,777. Id. § 414(a)(1)(C), 92 Stat. 1177 (amending 5 U.S.C. §
5108(a) (1976)).
"Id.
" With respect to SES positions, the participation of the Office of Management and
Budget in the allocation process is formalized by statute. The Civil Service Reform Act of
1978 requires the OPM to act upon agency requests for SES positions "in consultation with"
that Office. Id. § 402(a), 92 Stat. 1158 (to be codified at 5 U.S.C. § 3133(c) (1976)).
'7Derived from figures contained in letter from Anne A. Andrews, Personnel Management Specialist, Office of Personnel Management, to Antonin Scalia (Mar. 11, 1980) (on file
with The University of Chicago Law Review).
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Federal Labor Relations Authority
Federal Maritime Commission
Federal Trade Commission
Interstate Commerce Commission
National Labor Relations Board

73%
41%
24%
61%
63%

This situation represents the triumph of the courtroom mystique
over reason.
The only function committed by law to the dispositive determination of the administrative law judge is the finding of disputed
issues of fact where demeanor evidence is entirely conclusive,'-if
such a situation can ever occur. In article III courts, the entire factfinding function is often committed to a lay jury. Of course, administrative law judges perform many other important functions: they
make findings of fact of an often extraordinarily difficult nature, not
primarily dependent upon the credibility of demeanor evidence;
they make important decisions regarding statutory law and agency
policy; they write opinions that marshal the facts and frame the
issues in a comprehensible fashion; and they conduct proceedings
so as to assure a full and informative record. These functions are
absolutely vital to the administrative process. But they represent
merely the first step, and not necessarily the final stage, of agency
action. The AL's decision may be reviewed-and frequently is reviewed-de novo, by the agency head69 (usually advised and assisted
by agency employees) or even, in some agencies, by a review board
composed entirely of agency employees.7 0 Even if the agency does
nothing but formal adjudication, surely a substantial proportion of
its most talented career officers (presumably its supergrades) should
be devoted to this review function. And of course, virtually no
agency limits its activities to formal adjudication.7 1 All of the major
" See, e.g., NLRB v. Thompson & Co., 208 F.2d 743 (2d Cir. 1953); NLRB v. Universal
Camera Corp., 190 F.2d 429 (2d Cir. 1951).
" See 5 U.S.C. § 557(b) (1976).
" The availability of this procedure depends upon statutory authority for the agency's
delegation of its decisionmaking power. Such authority is possessed by the agency that
employs more than half of all administrative law judges, the Social Security Administration,
whose Appeals Council has the power of discretionary review over all AUJ decisions, and in
fact reviews thousands each year. See Dixon, The Welfare State and Mass Justice:A Warning
from the Social Security DisabilityProgram, 1972 DuKE L.J. 681, 698-99. The Federal Communications Commission and the Interstate Commerce Commission also use review boards
extensively. See generally Freedman, Review Boards in the Administrative Process, 117 U.
PA. L. REv. 546 (1969).
" To my knowledge, the only exception is the Occupational Safety and Health Review
Commission, whose only function (apart from internal administration) is the adjudication of
challenges to violation citations and penalty notifications issued by the Secretary of Labor
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regulatory agencies have, in addition, responsibilities of investigation, advice giving, enforcement (including prosecution in administrative proceedings) and the development of legislative initiatives-together with the training, budgetary, and supervisory responsibilities that all of this activity entails. One would expect a
considerable number of career supergrade and SES employees to be
devoted to those tasks.
Most important of all, moreover, there is rulemaking, which has
in the past decade replaced adjudication as the central mechanism
of agency law giving: As one scholar has observed: "The increased
use of rulemaking has changed the whole structure of administrative
law, for as recently as the early 1960's it was generally assumed that
any significant regulatory scheme would rely to a considerable extent on trial-type hearings." 72 I have elsewhere described the recent
development of administrative law as a "constant and accelerating
flight away from individualized, adjudicatory proceedings to generalized disposition through rulemaking. ' 7 3 Is it not perverse that,
even as the governmental and societal importance of adjudication
has dramatically decreased, we have devoted an increasingly higher
proportion of our best-paid civil servants to positions designed primarily for that function? At the FCC, for example-to take an
agency whose statistics are far from the worst-almost a third of all
career supergrade and SES positions are allocated to administrative
law judges. 74 The remainder are distributed among all the lawyers,
economists, statisticians, scientists, and managers necessary not
only to prosecute and review matters conducted by ALJs but also
to enforce and administer the regulation of all broadcast and
common-carrier communications; to develop policies for confronting the constant stream of new technology from cable to satellites
to computers, and of new societal demands from consumerism to
minority rights; and to advise and assist the Congress in the pending
"rewrite" of a Communications Act that is almost fifty years old.
The scarcity of high-level career positions at the FCC is demonstrated by Professor Freedman's poignant observation-in discussing the Commission's initial establishment of a five-member Review
Board to review ALJ decisions-that "[t]he . . .decision to name
under the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970.29 U.S.C. §§ 659(c), 661, as amended
by Act of Mar. 27, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-251, § 2(a)(7), 92 Stat. 183.
72 Pedersen, Formal Records and Informal Rulemaking, 85 YALE L.J. 38, 38-39 (1975).
13 Scalia, Vermont Yankee: The APA, the D.C. Circuit, and the Supreme Court, 1978
Sup. CT. REv. 345, 376.
11See text at note 67 supra.
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senior staff employees to the Review
Board undoubtedly thinned the
75
'
ranks at a very important level.
The harmful effect of the disproportionate allocation of highlevel positions to administrative law judges is difficult to perceive
with respect to nonlawyer professionals, since it is indirect; but with
lawyers the "brain drain" is apparent. Senior careerists in the general counsel's office or the prosecutory division of an agency often
find advancement blocked for sheer lack of available SES positions,
and thus seek appointment as administrative law judges.7 6 This
drain will undoubtedly be accelerated by the 1978 amendments to
the civil service laws, which subject all SES positions-which do not
include administrative law judges-to a one-year probationary period, and to permissive and mandatory removal for failure to
achieve specified ratings in annual evaluations.7 7 The adjudication
of individual cases simply does not warrant such a disproportionate
commitment of the government's best-paid and best-secured positions.
Moreover, to return to the point I began with, this system does
not even have the merit of producing the best possible ALJ corps.
There is no substitute for determining advancement on the basis of
actual on-the-job performance. And there is no substitute for determining nonadvancement on that basis as well, causing the less competent to depart for fields where their particular skills can be better
applied. Blind-man's buff does not really work.
This is why, of course, a number of the most important agencies
have clung tenaciously to the system of "selective certification"
despite consistent opposition from the organized bar.7 8 That is the
system whereby the OPM establishes separate candidate registers,
apart from the general register, for those agencies that assert that
their administrative law judges require "specialized experience." To
qualify for the specialized register of the SEC, for example, a candidate must have
[t]wo years of experience in the preparation, presentation, or
hearing of formal cases, or in making decisions on the basis of
Freedman, supra note 70, at 565.
"1This is facilitated by the system of selective certification described below, see text at
notes 78-81 infra.
" See 5 U.S.C.A. §§ 3393(d), 4314(b)(3) (West Supp. 1979).
' As noted by a former chairman of the American Bar Association's Section on Administrative Law, "[tihe ABA has persistently, unsuccessfully opposed the practice for many
years." Miller, The Vice of Selective Certificationin the Appointment of HearingExaminers,
20 AD. L. REV. 477, 480 (1968).
7'
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the record of such hearings, originating before governmental
regulatory bodies at the Federal, State, or local level, in the
field of securities financing and involving the public issuance
of securities or the trading of securities. 9
Obviously, the three top candidates certified to an agency from such
a specialized register ° are much more likely than those certified
from the general register to include present or past members of the
agency's own legal staff-and there is some evidence that that is the
whole object of the exercise.8 1 Opponents of the system charge that
it is prompted by "cronyism." Perhaps there is some element of
truth in that. When supergrades are so scarce for the agency's own
lawyer-careerists, it must rankle (and must render the in-house
career pattern much less attractive) to distribute them to marginally better qualified outsiders. But to the extent that the practice
of selective certification is not founded upon any genuine need for
specialized experience, surely there is a more valid basis for the
subterfuge than mere "cronyism." It is a means of avoiding exclusive reliance on a paper record, and on recommendations from unknown sources-by increasing the percentage of certified candidates
whose work (whether as agency staffer or practitioner appearing
before the agency) has actually been observed by officials in the
agency itself. It is difficult to condemn such a motive.
Even selective certification, however, does not help to reduce
the other irrational element in the current system-the necessity of
,,

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE ANNOUNCEMENT No.

318, 20-21 (1979).
Currently, 10 agencies, accounting for 248 of the 382 existing ALJ supergrade positions,
employ selective certification, see note 27 supra; 83 of the 98 A.J supergrade position
appointments made in the last five years came from the specialized registers, Letter from
John E. Flannery, Acting Director, Office of Administrative Law Judges, Office of Personnel
Management, to Antonin Scalia (Feb. 1, 1980) (on file with The University of ChicagoLaw
Review).
" In several instances, the agency request for the establishment of a specialized register

clearly displayed such an objective. For example, "the FPC's justification letter of August
17, 1950 referred to particular individuals and stated that it proposed to 'promote from within
where we have qualified and available employees eligible for promotion.' "U.S. CIVIL SERVICE
COMM'N SUBCOMM. ON RECRUITMENT, QUALIFICATIONS, AND APPOINTMENT, REPORT FORTHE STUDY

OF THE UTILIZATION OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES 40 (1974), reprinted in U.S. CIVIL SERVICE
COMM'N, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE STUDY OF THE UTILIZATION OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

JUDGES, appendix (1974) [hereinafter cited as U.S. CIVIL SERVICE COMM'N, UTILIZATION
STUDY]. A 1969 study conducted by Professor Robert Park for the Administrative Conference

noted that since 1964, fifty-two of the sixty-six appointments to ALJ positions in agencies
employing selective certification were individuals who had previously served on the appointing agency's staff. 1 ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORTS 381, 396

(1969). As a recent Conference publication observes, "there is no reason to think that the
effect is less prevalent today." ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., supra note 57, at 11.
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selecting the agency's highest-level judges on the basis of performance in some other job, most frequently a job that does not consist
of presiding, factfinding and decision writing. But the agencies have
found at least one means of somewhat alleviating this difficulty:
hiring their judges from lower-graded ALJ staffs at other agencies.
Such a move constitutes a noncompetitive "transfer," subject under
current regulations to OPM approval and to the candidate's qualifying on the higher-grade register, but not subject to the requirement
that he be among the top three on that register.12

IV. A RETURN TO A MUII-GRADE

STRUCTURE

Surely it is ironic that the zeal to preserve the impartiality of
hearing officers-manifested in the utterly impracticable commitment of promotional responsibility to the OPM-has produced a
system in which, quite reasonably, almost all of the most important
regulatory agencies strive to hire judges from their own prosecutory
staffs. A sensible system would institutionalize selection of senior
judges on the basis of first-hand observation, rather than merely
tolerate such selection through use (or abuse) of the selective certification and transfer devices. And it would permit such observation
during the candidate's performance of the actual work of judging in
the agency. It would establish, in short, a practicable system of
promotion from within the ALJ staff-a multi-grade structure.
82 5 C.F.R. § 930.206 (1978). This highly sensible practice of, in effect, using the lowergraded agencies as apprenticeships for the higher-graded agencies helps to explain the remarkable grade uniformity that has developed among agencies. Almost all major agencies
except the Social Security Administration now rank their judges at GS-16. This is in part a
necessary defense against inter-agency raiding. As described in the Civil Service Commission's 1974 Administrative Law Judge Study: "The CAWJ [chief administrative law judge]
of the U.S. Coast Guard states that the GS-15 grade makes it extremely difficult to recruit
competent ALJs and that if they are successfully recruited they are soon lost to other agencies
who offer them GS-16 grades." U.S. CIVL SERVICE COMM'N, UTIZATION STUDY, supra note
81, at 28.
The largest pool of apprentices, of course, consists of the 670 ALJs within the Social
Security Administration. Over the past five fiscal years, 49 judges have been transferred from
GS-15 positions to GS-16 positions in other agencies. Letter from John E. Flannery, Acting
Director, Office of Administrative Law Judges, Office of Personnel Management, to Antonin
Scalia (Feb. 1, 1980) (on file with The University of Chicago Law Review). The transfer
device is also a means whereby an agency can hire one of its own employees who does not
stand high enough to be certified from the general (or even a specialized) GS-16 register.
Such an employee qualifies at the top of the GS-15 register, is hired by some other agency at
that level, and then is promptly transferred back home at GS-16. Evidently to avoid, or at
least to render somewhat less blatant, this additional manifestation of the principle of promotion from within, the Civil Service Commission in 1976 amended its regulations to prohibit
AJ transfers before the decent period of one year of service. 41 Fed. Reg. 2074 (1976)
(codified at 5 C.F.R. § 930.206(c) (1979)).
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The obverse of the problem of achieving excellence is the problem of eliminating inadequacy. As noted earlier, current legislative
proposals for reform suggest the establishment of seven-year 83 or

ten-year 4 terms for administrative law judges, with reappointment
contingent upon favorable evaluation under a system administered
by the Administrative Conference of the United States. Such a system might help, but it would reach only the most egregious cases.
No one likes to dismiss a person, particularly an older person, from
a long-term job. It is primarily this aversion, rather than any deficiency in standards or procedures, which renders dismissal from the
civil service a rare occurrence-as is demonstrated by the fact that
career lawyers are rarely dismissed, even though lawyers are not
within the competitive service.8 The remedy of dismissal is simply
too draconian, and that underlying fact will not be changed simply
by casting the decision with respect to administrative law judges in
terms of failing to find adequate qualifications for continuation
rather than finding grounds for dismissal.
The only effective way to winnow out incompetence-at least
at professional levels-is the tried and true method long practiced
by the government and by more humane (if less efficient) private
employers: declining to promote, until the individual decides to go
where his talents will be better appreciated. If relatively young lawyers were brought into the ALJ program at lower levels-for example, at GS-13 or GS-14-it is unlikely that they would remain indefinitely if no promotion were forthcoming. The best would become
senior judges, the worst would leave, and (a crass but forceful consideration not yet mentioned) all would have substantial economic
incentive to put forth their best efforts. Perhaps some of the savings
derived from committing much of the current ALJ work to lower
grade levels could be devoted to creating a small number of GS-17
and GS-18 positions, further expanding the incentive system. Such
levels are not unreasonable for some of the most difficult cases handled by administrative law judges.
Most agencies would prefer a multi-grade system.8 6 Its demise
" S.

755, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 211 (1979).
" S. 262, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 208 (1979).
See 5 C.F.R. § 213.3102(d) (1978).
81 According to the U.S. Civil Service Commission Committee on the Study of the Utilization of Administrative Law Judges,
[a]ll but three of the agencies (Department of Agriculture, Civil Aeronautics Board,
and U.S. Coast Guard) felt that multiple grades for ALJs, even within a single agency,
were desirable. They are of the opinion that cases can be readily classified in terms of
inherent difficulty and that AJ grades should be assigned based upon such classifica-
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is primarily attributable, I believe, to the sheer inability of the
Office of Personnel Management to handle the recurrent promotion
decisions that it entails. As suggested above, the allocation of promotion responsibility to the OPM violates a fundamental tenet of
sound administration: he who decides should know. It also violates
another tenet: he who decides should reap the grief or benefit of his
decision. Unless promotion responsibility is shifted from the OPM,
there is little hope-or, for that matter, little desirability-of a rea
turn to a multi-grade system.
The problem, of course, is that promotion responsibility cannot
be lodged with the employing agency without raising fears that
special favor will be granted to those judges who consistently distort
their factfinding to support the agency position. It seems to me such
fears are exaggerated. Control of the promotion decision by trial
staff is surely unacceptable, but the decision could be lodged within
the agency at such a level that staff control would not occur. Surely
it is peculiar that agency heads are trusted to reverse a judge's
decision-even on the facts-and yet are not trusted to manage the
promotion of judges on a basis that will not reward biased factfinding.
Perhaps we are far enough removed from the ideological
ferment, particularly at the Labor Board, which underlay the
promotion provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act, to
acknowledge the possibility-in most if not all agencies-of a
system that is fair and equitable, and that still allows the agency
to promote its judges on the basis of its own intimate and
unique knowledge of their performance. There are, after all, impartial and respected judges in other areas of executive activity
whose promotion (and indeed, whose selection and firing) have
been subject to no special protections beyond those which the
agency itself has chosen to observe-for example, judges on the
Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals, 7 immigration
tion. The grades which they would assign range from GS-13 to GS-18.
supra note 81, at 29.
" For the Charter of the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals, adopted jointly by
the Secretary of Defense and the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, see 32 C.F.R.
pts. 1-39 vol. III app. A, at 219 (1976). The judges of this Board, numbering about thirty,
have long occupied the same grade level, but have regularly been promoted within grade by
the award of "quality step-increases" pursuant to section 5336 of Title 5, and the implementing OPM regulations, 5 C.F.R. § 531.410-.413 (1978). Of course, employing agencies have no
authority to award quality increases to administrative law judges. 5 C.F.R. § 930.210(c)
(1978).
Regrettably, all boards of contract appeals, including the Armed Services Board, have
recently undergone the same process of wholesale grade inflation and leveling previously

U.S. CIVIL SERVICE COMM'N, UTILIZATION STUDY,
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judges,88 and members of Atomic Safety and Licensing Boards.89
Indeed, even with respect to article III judges, the essential independence has been thought to demand security of tenure, but not
insulation from executive and congressional control over promotion
to higher courts through the appointment and confirmation powers.
In 1946, there might have been good reason to fear that examiners would be, in Senator Wiley's words, "men of bias, of ideological
preconceptions, of partisan fealty, of subservience to pressure
groups,, of habits of unfairness, of disregard of the true values and
weight of evidence."" In the more than thirty years since then, the
system of merit selection, the increased salary and prestige,
and-most important of all-the required functional separation
from prosecutory staff,9' have created a solid tradition of independence. It would be foolhardy to suggest that that tradition will alone
suffice as an ironclad guarantee against all improper influence. But
that, of course, is not the issue. The issue is whether, on balance,
the beneficial effects of the present system upon proper independence outweigh its detrimental effects upon quality and efficiency.
The answer seems to me to be no.
In a system that leaves promotional decisions to the agency,
there are various steps that can be taken to reduce to an absolute
minimum the possibility of improper influence. The greatest risk
comes from the ability of the prosecutory staff to harm the career
prospects of those judges who are not, in their view, sufficiently
sympathetic to the staff position. This risk can be substantially
reduced, if not entirely eliminated, by expanding the separation-offunctions provision of the APA 91 to exclude the prosecutory staff
accomplished with respect to administrative law judges. Recent legislation has established
all members of such contract appeal boards in all agencies at level GS-16 (GS-17 and GS-18
for vice-chairmen and chairmen, respectively). Contract Disputes Act of 1978, Pub. L. No.
95-563, § 8, 92 Stat. 2385 (to be codified at 41 U.S.C. § 607). Moreover, it provides that all
members "shall be selected and appointed to serve in the same manner as [administrative
law judges]." Id. The meaning of the last-quoted language is unclear; it may well subject
boards of contract appeals to the full panoply of OPM-administered protections, not only
with respect to hiring, but with respect to tenure and promotion as well. See S. REP. No. 118,
95th Cong., 2d Sess. 24 (1978), reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5235, 5258.
" The technical title is "special inquiry officer." See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(b)(4), 1226, 1252
(1976). Deportation proceedings that these officers conduct have been held by the Supreme
Court to carry a constitutional requirement of hearing before an impartial tribunal, and were
in fact subjected by the Court to the ALJ requirement of the Administrative Procedure Act
until Congress provided otherwise. See Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, modified,
339 U.S. 908 (1950); Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302 (1955).
See 42 U.S.C. § 2241 (1976); 10 C.F.R. § 1.11 (1979).
" See note 4 supra.
See 5 U.S.C. § 554(d) (1976).
92Id.
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from any decisional or recommendatory authority with respect to
promotion of administrative law judges. The Administrative Conference might be charged with establishing or approving the procedures to be used in evaluation of judges. And the chief administrative law judge-who, though appointed and removable (as chief)
by the agency, is disposed by position and training to be jealous of
incursions upon proper independence-might be assured a major
role in the evaluation process. (I would not, however, commit the
decision entirely to his control, since, particularly in the agencies
with small judicial staffs, he may be too much of a primus inter
pares, and the spirit of collegiality may deter the sort of hardheadedness that efficient promotional decisions require.)
The problem of improper influence would also be solved by
implementing proposals for establishment of a unified ALJ corps,
headed by an independent administrator. 3 There would be no obstacle to giving such an administrator authority over promotion.
Moreover, the unified-corps concept has some independent managerial advantages-notably, the efficiency of scale which would eliminate the phenomenon of highly paid judges who occasionally have
no work within their own agency,9" and which would make possible
a range of grade levels not feasible within many single agencies. On
the other hand, it seems unlikely that the administrator of a unified
corps would have the same degree of knowledge concerning the
judges' performance, or the same degree of incentive to maximize
the quality of that performance, as the agencies whose substantive
programs are affected. In any case, the unified corps would make a
fundamental change in the perceived role of the administrative law
judge as the "front line" of the agency itself rather than an impartial
outsider; and it is that issue which should probably control the fate
of the proposal. But the efficiency advantages, if the corps is combined with a multi-level grade system, should not be ignored-as
they seem to be in most discussions of the proposal.
Whatever solution is adopted, surely the current system-hiring "by the numbers" into an effectively life-tenured job,
with no advancement potential, and with no allocation 6f simpler
work to less experienced (and hence lower-paid) individuals-is a
horror story of personnel management which should come to an end.
It does not even have the dubious merit of providing gold-plated
judicial services at an exorbitant cost, but rather prevents intelli, See text and notes at notes 9-12 supra.
" See generally Scalia, The Hearing Examiner Loan Program, 1971 DUKE L.J. 319.

80

The University of Chicago Law Review

[47:57

gent selection and adequate compensation of the finest judges, deters voluntary departure of the worst, and erodes incentive all along
the way.

